Non-HIPAA Covered Entities: Data in Registries

Leslie Francis
Distinguished Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
Director, Center for Law & Biomedical Sciences
University of Utah
Outline

• Non-HIPAA covered entities: primary examples
• Registries: types, data sources
• Some preliminary data about registries and the inadequacy of protections
Non-HIPAA Covered Entities: Primary Examples

- Providers who do not have any records in electronic form (some counselors); near-providers (massage therapists)
- Social media (e.g. Facebook; Patients Like Me)
- Web search history (e.g. WebMD)
- Wearables (e.g. FitBit)
- Personal record storage (e.g. exercise logs; calorie intake logs, PHRs)
- Recreational genetics (e.g. 23 and Me)
- Registries (e.g. CF Foundation Patient Registry)
Non-HIPAA Covered Entities: Why the Problem?

- Health information may be as detailed and as sensitive as information possessed by HIPAA-covered entities
- May receive PHI from HIPAA-covered entities, without patients realizing that the PHI has been transferred or is no longer HIPAA-protected
- Protections (primarily FTC, state law) uneven at best for some
- Privacy policies often difficult to find, hard to read
- Important provisions may be dispersed among Terms of Conditions or at other places on the website
- Users may have little information about or control over how data are used or transferred by these entities, especially if there has been a representation that data have been de-identified
The Social Media Argument: People like to share because they judge they are getting benefits

• Fair enough, but . . .
• People may not realize what information is being collected, or how much, even on social media.
• Many data transfers from HIPAA-covered entities to non-HIPAA covered entities occur without either effective notice or choice for patients
• Registries are an example
Registries

- Repositories of patient data collected for specific purposes
- May be limited to patients with specific conditions (e.g. rare genetic diseases), specific known exposures (e.g. to a toxin), specific treatments (e.g. cardiac device)
- May be funded from public $$, charitable contributions, pharmaceutical companies, professional organizations
Registry Landscape: Vast

- Public health: tumors, birth defects
- Disease specific
  - Charitable (e.g., CF Foundation)
  - Pharmaceutical company sponsored (e.g. MastCell Connect for mastocytosis; sponsor blueprint Medicines)
- Patient generated (e.g. Genetic Alliance)
- Researcher-created (e.g. SEER)
- Medical association sponsored (e.g. ACC)
Data sources for registries

• Data originally collected for clinical care, in electronic form, within the HIPAA-covered entity
• Data originally collected for clinical research within the HIPAA-covered entity
• Data entered by patients themselves
• Data entered by family members of patients
Registry data collection and use

- May be by one-time patient consent to entry on an ongoing basis
- May be by one-time surrogate consent to entry (e.g. parents); although many require adult consent to continuing data collection not all do
- May collect data directly from clinical records or from patients themselves
- Typically require patient consent for participation in particular studies using identifiable data, but not for uses or transfers of data in de-identified form
- May sell de-identified data to support registry operations
Identified or de-identified?

• Once de-identified, no longer HIPAA PHI
• Use of de-identified data not human subjects research
• Risk of re-identification
  – Has been primary subject of discussion regarding de-identified data
  – But re-identification is not the only, or even the primary, concern
Concerns beyond re-identification

• Inferences from conjoined data sets
  – Novel or surprising
  – Stigmatizing
  – May apply to others not included in original data sets

• Uses of data that are disapproved
  – Sense of contribution to something that is wrong
  – Loss of identity

• Uses of data that could cause economic harm
  – Job costs for groups: changes in workplace policy
  – Benefits loss: redlining
Data Downstream: protections?

• If de-identified, typically an agreement not to re-identify
• If identified
  – Data use agreements
  – Patient authorization (HIPAA)
  – Patient consent (research data)
  – IRB review
• Enforcement? Contract law, laws applicable to certain positions (e.g. public health employees, university faculty)
• How monitored? We don’t really know in many cases
Pilot study of registry governance

- NIH website list of registries
- Selected those with contact information, data collection on an ongoing basis: 59
- Successful contact with 30; 20 agreed to discuss governance
- Varied in size from 200 to 800,000 participants
- IRB approved questionnaire
Preliminary findings: governance

• All registries had identified staff, decision-making bodies
• Only half had an advisory board or second body of advisors to guide technical, scientific, or ethical decision making
• Fewer than a third were transparent about their decision-making process
Preliminary findings: privacy and security

- Half of the registries publicly specified uses of the data they were collecting
- Fewer than half permitted participants to access their data
- One-third gave specific information about data storage; this included one that stored data on a google format and another that stored data on servers outside of the US
- Only ONE registry had a protocol for addressing data breaches
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