

1 September 29, 2016

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3 The Honorable Sylvia M. Burwell

4 Secretary

5 Department of Health and Human Services

6 200 Independence Avenue, S.W.

7 Washington, D.C. 20201

8

9 Re: **Recommendations on the HIPAA Minimum Necessary Standard**

10

11 Dear Secretary Burwell:

12

13 As Chair of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS or
14 Committee), your advisory committee on health data, statistics, and the Health Insurance
15 Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), I write to transmit findings and
16 recommendations of the Committee regarding the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s “minimum
17 necessary” standard. This standard establishes the circumstances under which a custodian
18 of protected health information must limit the sharing of information to the minimum
19 necessary to accomplish the purpose of the disclosure.

20

21 The Committee held a hearing on the minimum necessary standard on June 17,
22 2016. Experts who testified agreed that this standard and its underlying principles are as
23 important today as when the Privacy Rule was drafted. They underscored that although it
24 is an integral part of the Rule, the minimum necessary standard remains poorly
25 understood and poorly implemented by covered entities and their business associates.
26 They also agreed that it is time to update the guidance and implementation specifications
27 and work to improve compliance with the standard.

27

28 Executive Summary

29

30 The Committee reaffirms the importance of the minimum necessary standard as
31 an essential provision of the HIPAA Privacy Rule for four key reasons. First, it limits
32 disclosure of protected health information outside the HIPAA umbrella and serves as a
33 guide for covered entities when responding to requests from third parties. Second, it
34 serves as an added safeguard in combination with other policies and practices to ensure
35 compliance by covered entities and business associates with the HIPAA Privacy and
36 Security Rules. Third, it is an additional protection for patients in situations where
37 authorization is not required. Finally, it serves as a critical check across the health
38 information ecosystem, including public health, prompting dialogue about what
39 information is needed and for what purposes.

40

41 The Committee’s overarching recommendation is that HHS updates its guidance
42 on the minimum necessary standard to incorporate changes to HIPAA introduced by
43 legislation since the Privacy Rule became effective, and to address known barriers to
44 effective implementation. To that end, the Committee offers ten recommendations. The
45 first six address substantive issues with the minimum necessary standard or
46 implementation specifications that should be addressed in updated guidance. These are:

47 **1: HHS should clarify the independent obligations of business associates to comply**
48 **with the minimum necessary standard and should develop specific guidance and**
49 **instruction for business associates in this regard. HHS should also develop guidance**
50 **for covered entities on oversight of business associate compliance with minimum**
51 **necessary obligations.**

52
53 **2: HHS should clarify the breach notification requirements pertaining to**
54 **violations of the minimum necessary standard. HHS' guidance should define the**
55 **circumstances under which a breach of the minimum necessary standard occurs, at**
56 **what level reporting is mandatory, and what types of enforcement may be expected**
57 **for different violations.**

58
59 **3: HHS should clarify the elements of an adequate "specific justification" that is**
60 **required to use, disclose, or request a patient's entire medical record. For example,**
61 **HHS should illustrate with specific examples, use cases, or analytic methodologies**
62 **circumstances that may legitimately warrant use or disclosure of entire medical**
63 **records and the justification that would be adequate to support each. The guidance**
64 **also could recommend any special assurances about privacy and data security that**
65 **covered entities should seek before supplying data for such uses.**

66
67 **4: HHS should require covered entities and business associates to adopt a list of**
68 **criteria for consideration, a procedure for evaluating a request in accordance with**
69 **the criteria, and a governance structure that provides oversight of the minimum**
70 **necessary determination process.**

71
72 **5: The Committee recommends that HHS make no change to the current**
73 **exception to the minimum necessary standard for treatment.**

74
75 **6: In developing new Minimum Necessary guidance, HHS should specifically**
76 **address the application of the minimum necessary standard to HIPAA named**
77 **transaction standards for administrative functions pertaining to payment and**
78 **operations. In particular, HHS's guidance should address the applicability of**
79 **minimum necessary to new transactions such as those involving attachments, and**
80 **data exchanges involved in fulfilling alternative payment models.**

81
82 The final four recommendations address ways to formulate, frame and disseminate
83 updated guidance and corresponding training, particularly that HHS should make a draft
84 of the guidance available and solicit public comment prior to issuance in final form.

85
86 **7. HHS should offer education that clearly illustrates how the minimum necessary**
87 **standard interacts with other provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule to improve**
88 **overall understanding. The Privacy Rule provides a four-tier framework of**
89 **protections, which is subject to some misunderstanding among covered entities and**
90 **the public. The Committee offers an analysis that explains these important**
91 **interrelationships.**

92

93 **8: HHS should issue updated guidance in draft form and solicit public comment**
94 **before issuing final guidance.**

95
96 **9: HHS should prepare orientation materials and implementation guides tailored**
97 **to the perspectives of various stakeholders.**

98
99 **10. In promulgating guidance, HHS should use a range of multimedia**
100 **communications channels to disseminate published guidelines, “Frequently Asked**
101 **Questions,” web training, and case study illustrations tailored to the needs of**
102 **various constituencies. Dissemination should include a public education component.**
103

104 In addition to these recommendations, the Committee offers its preliminary
105 perspective on issues relevant to the minimum necessary standard such as evolving
106 technology, cybersecurity, and genetic information in an Attachment to this letter. These
107 were beyond the scope of the June hearing and the Committee will consider how it might
108 be of assistance to the Department in addressing these policy issues that interact with the
109 minimum necessary standard.

110
111 The Minimum Necessary Standard and Implementation Specifications
112

113 The minimum necessary standard embodies the general privacy principle that
114 using, disclosing, or requesting a person’s protected health information (PHI) impacts
115 individual privacy. Covered entities, when they use or disclose PHI or request PHI from
116 another covered entity or business associate, “must make reasonable efforts” to limit the
117 PHI disclosed “to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use,
118 disclosure, or request.”¹ The minimum necessary standard acknowledges that PHI
119 includes highly sensitive, personal information, and individuals care not only *whether*
120 their data is shared, but also care *how much* is shared.

121 After stating its broad minimum necessary standard, the Privacy Rule provides six
122 exceptions. These exceptions allow data to be used by or disclosed to:

- 123 1. Health care providers treating the individual;²
- 124 2. Individuals accessing their own information;³
- 125 3. Third parties that the record subject has authorized;⁴
- 126 4. The Secretary of HHS for performing oversight functions;⁵
- 127 5. Any party to whom the information is required to be disclosed by law;⁶ and
- 128 6. Covered entities for their own HIPAA compliance activities.⁷

129 When the minimum necessary standard applies, covered entities must adhere to
130 the implementation specifications.⁸ These provide that the amount of information that is

¹ See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1).

² 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(i).

³ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(ii).

⁴ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(iii).

⁵ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(iv).

⁶ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(iv).

⁷ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(vi).

131 “necessary” should be judged relative to the data user’s intended purpose.⁹ Covered
132 entities should use, disclose, and request only the least amount of PHI that is “reasonably
133 necessary” to accomplish that purpose. They also must restrict the range of people who
134 will have access to use PHI. The minimum necessary standard requires covered entities to
135 identify those persons or classes of persons “who need access to the information to carry
136 out their duties,” to limit their access to the types of PHI needed to do their jobs, and to
137 place appropriate conditions on such access.¹⁰

138 For data disclosures and requests that are routine and recurring, covered entities
139 should implement policies and procedures.¹¹ Covered entities may develop standard
140 protocols for routine and recurring requests. For other, non-routine disclosures, case-by-
141 case review is required, based on criteria that the covered entity must establish.¹²
142 Importantly, the Privacy Rule provides for the possibility that, at times, a patient’s entire
143 medical record may be the minimum amount of data that is “necessary to accomplish the
144 purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”¹³ When this is true, the need for the entire
145 medical record must be “specifically justified.”¹⁴

146 The Department issued guidance on the minimum necessary standard in April
147 2003 when the original HIPAA Privacy Rule went into effect. The 2009 Health
148 Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act¹⁵ introduced
149 some limits on covered entities’ discretion for determining what constitutes “minimum
150 necessary” and required covered entities to limit the use, disclosure of PHI, to the extent
151 practicable, to a limited data set to accomplish the intended purpose of such use,
152 disclosure, or request. HITECH also clarified that the custodian of the PHI (as opposed to
153 the requester) is responsible for making the minimum necessary determination. HITECH
154 required the Secretary to issue guidance to clarify these changes no later than August 17,
155 2010. The Department has not yet issued this guidance.

156 In January 2013, the Department released a final rule, *Modifications to the HIPAA*
157 *Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health*
158 *Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic*
159 *Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules*, that is
160 known as the “Omnibus Rule.”¹⁶ The Omnibus Rule included amendments concerning
161 the application of the minimum necessary standard to business associates when they are
162 using, disclosing, or requesting PHI from a covered entity, and making business

⁸ 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(1)-(5).

⁹ See, e.g., § 164.514(d)(3)(i) (requiring minimum necessary disclosures of PHI to be limited “to the information reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the request was made.”); § 164.514(d)(4)(i) (calling for covered entities, when requesting information, to limit their requests to what is “reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the request is made”).

¹⁰ § 164.514(d)(2)(i).

¹¹ § 164.514(d)(3)(i), (d)(4)(ii).

¹² § 164.514(d)(3)(ii), (d)(4)(iii).

¹³ § 164.514(d)(5).

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ The HITECH Act was passed as Div. A, Title XIII, and Div. B, Title IV, of Pub. L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 123 Stat. 115, at 226. The codification of the privacy provisions may be found at Sec. 13001, 42 U.S.C. § 17921 *et seq.*

¹⁶ 78 FED. REG. 5565 (Jan. 25, 2013).

163 associates directly liable for violations of the minimum necessary standard. The Omnibus
164 Rule also required that covered entities and business associates investigate any violation
165 of the minimum necessary standard to determine the probability that PHI was
166 compromised and whether a breach notification would be required. This Rule also
167 clarified that genetic information is PHI and subject to the minimum necessary standard
168 in the same way as any other PHI.

169 The Omnibus Rule sought to address concerns about how the minimum necessary
170 standard applies to disclosures of data to public health officials. The implementation
171 specifications originally allowed covered entities, when disclosing data to public health
172 officials without individual authorization, to rely on public officials' representations that
173 the amount of data requested was the minimum necessary.¹⁷ However, privacy advocates,
174 clinicians, and others raised concern that there was no check on potential overreach by
175 public health officials since covered entities could simply defer to a requester's
176 assessment that the amount of data requested was the minimum necessary.

177 In response to this concern, the HITECH Act contained a provision requiring
178 covered entities to determine the minimum amount of PHI for a disclosure.¹⁸ However,
179 the Department, after considering the issue, did not modify the provision of the Privacy
180 Rule permitting a covered entity to rely on minimum necessary representations by public
181 officials.¹⁹

182

183 Current State of Minimum Necessary Implementation

184

185 The 2003 HIPAA Privacy Rule was drafted and adopted at a time when health
186 records were largely paper based and decentralized. Siloed paper records served as a *de*
187 *facto* physical barrier that limited access and use. Today electronic health records are
188 rapidly becoming the norm, and the Department's policies promote interoperable health
189 records so information is available when and where it is needed for coordinated patient
190 care services. In addition, the Department's policy promotes the use of aggregated and
191 de-identified health information to advance population and community health.

192 As the environment has changed and the Privacy Rule has been updated in ways
193 that affect implementation of the minimum necessary standard, the guidance on how best
194 to comply has not kept pace. Between 2003 and 2013, complaints related to the minimum
195 necessary standards were among the top five issues investigated by the Office for Civil
196 Rights (OCR). OCR has provided case study examples that highlight noncompliance
197 caused by lack of organizational policy and training regarding application of the
198 minimum necessary standard and by inappropriate handling of sensitive information.²⁰
199 The closely related issue of improper uses and disclosures of data has, every year through

¹⁷ The specifications can be found at § 164.514(d)(3)(iii).

¹⁸ See HITECH Act, § 13405(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17935.

¹⁹ See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 78 FED. REG. 5566, 5700 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (revising various parts of 45 C.F.R. § 164.514, but not altering § 164.514(d)(3)(iii)).

²⁰ See case examples at <http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/top-five-issues-investigated-cases-closed-corrective-action-calendar-year/index.html>

200 2014, been the top issue investigated by OCR, and case examples OCR has published
201 illustrate violations both in the actual disclosure and in the process. OCR has imposed
202 remedial actions including the establishment of complete policies, institution of proper
203 procedures, and improvements in training.

204 In preparation for testimony, the American Health Information Management
205 Association (AHIMA) conducted an electronic survey of members working in privacy
206 and security management, primarily in acute care environments. Three hundred six acute
207 care hospitals or health systems responded. About half indicated that their organizations
208 have policies and procedures related to the minimum necessary standard and a process
209 for reviewing a request for information to determine whether it exceeds the adopted
210 policy. Less than one-third of respondents have adopted an operating definition for what
211 constitutes minimum necessary or have standard protocols to guide decisions about
212 minimum necessary disclosures. In cases when a business associate carries out a
213 disclosure on behalf of a respondent, fewer than half of the respondents reported having
214 knowledge of the criteria used by the business associate in making minimum necessary
215 determinations.

216 The Committee heard testimony that application of minimum necessary
217 principles is an essential element of the overall design of the Privacy Rule precisely
218 because the Rule permits many non-consensual uses and disclosures. We heard
219 arguments in favor of applying the minimum necessary standard to disclosures for
220 treatment and limiting disclosures for payment and health care operations to the least
221 identifiable form. But we also heard that the current exception for treatment should be
222 preserved at this time because of the potential impact on patient care, safety, legal
223 liability and overall system efficiency. Even panelists who advocated for the minimum
224 necessary standard to apply to treatment acknowledged that this would require
225 information technology with advanced privacy functionality that does not now exist in
226 practice.

227 The Committee heard testimony calling for a standard operating definition of
228 “minimum necessary.” We also heard testimony that the current implementation
229 guidance calling for development of standard protocols for routine and recurring requests
230 may be counterproductive because of the scale of disclosures and the burden of
231 maintaining scores of such protocols. The current minimum necessary standard is based
232 on “reasonableness” rather than an absolute standard, and the Committee heard testimony
233 that this is a strength given the range of situations that arise in managing access, use, and
234 disclosure.

235 The panelists who participated in the June hearing were aligned about the need
236 for and potential value of updated and improved guidance and education illustrating best
237 practices and procedures. This includes guidance regarding the obligations of business
238 associates. Current guidance ties the business associate’s obligations to the covered
239 entity’s minimum necessary policies and procedures, a major challenge for business
240 associates serving thousands or even tens of thousands of covered entities. Covered
241 entities and business associates also need guidance as to whether disclosing more than the
242 minimum necessary constitutes a reportable breach.

243

244 Short term Priorities and Recommendations

245

246 The Committee's overarching recommendation is that HHS update guidance on
247 the minimum necessary standard to incorporate changes to the Privacy Rule introduced
248 by the 2009 HITECH Act, the 2013 Omnibus Rule, and to address known barriers to
249 effective implementation. As reported by our panelists, the lack of updated guidance
250 creates a vacuum leading to a high degree of variability among covered entities and
251 business associates. It should be noted that the Committee did not hear testimony from
252 representatives of all types of covered entities such as physician practices, long term care
253 facilities, or post-acute care facilities. However, the Committee believes it safe to assume
254 that all will benefit from improved and updated guidance and corresponding education
255 and training.

256 The first six recommendations address substantive issues with the minimum
257 necessary standard or implementation specifications that should be addressed in updated
258 guidance. The final four recommendations address ways to formulate, frame, and present
259 updated guidance and corresponding training.

260 The Committee also discussed but is not offering recommendations on
261 additional important issues relating to minimum necessary standard that were beyond the
262 scope of this hearing. These include minimum necessary implications of the evolving
263 technology and data environments, cybersecurity, genetic information, and public health.
264 A preliminary discussion of these issues is found in Appendix B.

265

266 **Recommendation 1: Minimum Necessary and Business Associates**

267

268 **HHS should clarify the independent obligations of business associates to**
269 **comply with the minimum necessary standard and should develop specific guidance**
270 **and instruction for business associates in this regard. HHS should also develop**
271 **guidance for covered entities on oversight of business associate compliance with**
272 **minimum necessary obligations.**

273 Under current guidance business associates contracts must limit uses of,
274 disclosures of, and requests for PHI to be consistent with the covered entity's minimum
275 necessary policies and procedures. The business associate is therefore expected to comply
276 with the covered entity's policies. This can be problematic if the covered entity's practices
277 are weak or inadequate. Further, business associates may contract with dozens, hundreds,
278 or even thousands of covered entities each with their own policies and procedures.

279 Business associate guidance should make explicit the obligation of business
280 associates to comply independently under the minimum necessary standard. Clarifying
281 the obligations of the business associate to comply independently with the minimum
282 necessary standard would be consistent with how other HIPAA provisions, such as the
283 Security Rule, are handled for business associates. HHS should make explicit in its
284 guidance for business associates the obligation to adopt compliant policies and
285 procedures, and to provide evidence of compliance with minimum necessary standards.
286 Covered entities can raise the bar at their discretion through business associate
287 contracting, but specifying an independent obligation would create a baseline level of
288 compliance that is not now in place.

289

290 **Recommendation 2: Minimum Necessary and Breach Notification**

291

292 **HHS should clarify the breach notification requirements pertaining to**
293 **violations of the minimum necessary standard. HHS’ guidance should define the**
294 **circumstances under which a breach of the minimum necessary standard occurs, at**
295 **what level reporting is mandatory, and what types of enforcement may be expected**
296 **for different violations.**

297 The hearing revealed concerns regarding the relationship between the minimum
298 necessary standard and breach notification requirements. In past guidance related to the
299 HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, HHS has broadly stated that uses and disclosures of
300 PHI that violate the minimum necessary provisions of HIPAA may qualify as breaches
301 and that such incidents must be evaluated like any other security incident. Covered
302 entities and business associates want to know under what circumstances the use or
303 disclosure of PHI above and beyond what is minimally necessary to achieve a purpose
304 constitutes a breach. For example, does it constitute a breach if a provider sends to a
305 payer more data than what the payer needs to process a claim?

306 Under the Breach Notification Rule, a “breach” is defined as the unauthorized
307 acquisition, use, or disclosure of PHI that compromises the security or privacy of such
308 information. There are three exceptions to this definition: 1) when a member of the
309 covered entity’s workforce acquires or uses PHI in good faith, and does not further use or
310 disclose the information in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule; 2) when a person
311 authorized to use PHI inadvertently discloses PHI to another person who is also covered
312 by the Rule; and 3) when there is a good faith belief that the unauthorized person to
313 whom the PHI has been disclosed would not be able to use or disclose the information.
314 Given this definition and the exceptions, it is not clear under what circumstances a use or
315 disclosure that included more than the information minimally necessary to achieve the
316 purpose of the use or disclosure would constitute a breach.

317
318 **Recommendation 3: Disclosing or Requesting a Patient’s Entire Medical Record**
319

320 **HHS should clarify the elements of an adequate “specific justification” that**
321 **is required to use, disclose, or request a patient’s entire medical record. For**
322 **example, HHS should illustrate with specific examples, use cases, or analytic**
323 **methodologies circumstances that may legitimately warrant use or disclosure of**
324 **entire medical records and the justification that would be adequate to support each.**
325 **The guidance also could recommend any special assurances about privacy and data**
326 **security that covered entities should seek before supplying data for such uses.**

327 The minimum necessary standard has enduring relevance and in the years ahead,
328 must be applied in a 21st-century data environment that challenges many of the
329 assumptions underlying the original Privacy Rule. One important aspect of the future data
330 environment is a growing capacity to extract useful insights (for treatment, research, and
331 public health applications) by marshaling very large, detailed data resources that
332 juxtapose individuals’ longitudinal health histories with other sources of data
333 characterizing their biology, behaviors, exposures, outcomes, and subjective patient
334 experiences. The minimum necessary standard is rooted in a 20th-century concept of
335 hypothesis-testing studies, where investigators know in advance precisely what they were
336 looking for and could specify the data that would be “necessary” to test the hypothesis. In
337 contrast, many 21st-century regulatory, science, clinical, research, and public health

338 questions lend themselves to hypothesis-free analysis: for example, sifting through large
339 datasets to identify correlations between genotype and phenotypes to discover the clinical
340 significance of a novel genetic variant, or searching through insurance records for signals
341 of adverse events in patients who received certain treatments. For these analytical
342 methods, the “minimum necessary” data to support discovery may be “as much data as
343 can be obtained.” The Privacy Rule has always allowed for the possibility that, for some
344 uses, a patient’s entire medical record may be the minimum amount of data that is
345 “necessary to accomplish the purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”²¹ The Privacy
346 Rule states that when this is true, the need for the entire medical record must be
347 “specifically justified.”²² As advanced “big data” analytic techniques grow more
348 common in coming years, covered entities may face a greater number of requests for
349 patients’ entire medical records. They could benefit from guidance on appropriate criteria
350 to apply, procedures to follow, and questions to ask when reviewing such requests.

351

352 **Recommendation 4: Standard Protocols for Minimum Necessary**

353

354 **HHS should require covered entities and business associates to adopt a list**
355 **of criteria for consideration, a procedure for evaluating a request in accordance**
356 **with the criteria, and a governance structure that provides oversight of the**
357 **minimum necessary determination process.**

358

359 The current standard requires a covered entity to adopt *a priori*, a set of
360 procedures and standard protocols for processing requests for PHI. However, the
361 Committee heard testimony that developing standard protocols in advance for each type
362 of disclosure (e.g. ER, admitting, radiology, etc.) is complex and burdensome, because
363 each disclosure is necessarily contextual. Covered entities are continually processing
364 substantial volumes of both requests and disclosures, but to try to create minimum
365 necessary protocols for each routine disclosure or request creates an excessive burden
366 that outweighs the benefits contemplated by the Rule. It is not practical or necessary to
367 determine what can be used, disclosed, or requested, included or excluded, in every
368 possible circumstance. Moreover, what we learned from the AHIMA survey was that the
369 majority of organizations do not have protocols addressing every possible eventuality.
370 While the minimum necessary standard should apply, covered entities should not end up
370 “drowning in a sea of standard protocols.”²³

371

372 HHS could assist covered entities and business associates to better use their
373 resources by adopting a clear operating definition of minimum necessary; promoting a
374 criterion-based procedure for review of uses, disclosures, and requests where the standard
375 applies; and requiring a robust process of oversight and accountability.

375

²¹ See § 164.514(d)(5).

²² *Id.*

²³ See, Greene, Adam H., Testimony before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Confidentiality & Security, Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Stats., “Minimum Necessary and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)” (June 26, 2016), at 4.

376 **Recommendation 5: The Treatment Exception**

377

378 **The Committee recommends that HHS make no change to the current**
379 **exception to the minimum necessary standard for treatment.**

380

381 While the issue was raised in the hearing, we did not hear consensus, particularly
382 because the technology is not available to support such a change

383

384 **Recommendation 6: Minimum Necessary and Administrative Functions**

385

386 **In developing new Minimum Necessary guidance, HHS should specifically**
387 **address the application of the minimum necessary standard to HIPAA named**
388 **transaction standards for administrative functions pertaining to payment and**
389 **operations. In particular, HHS’s guidance should address the applicability of**
390 **minimum necessary to new transactions such as those involving attachments, and**
391 **data exchanges involved in fulfilling alternative payment models.**

392

393 The minimum necessary standard applies to health care administrative
394 transactions such as processing claims or determining eligibility. For each of these
395 transactions (all associated with payment and operations functions), HHS has named an
396 electronic standard that the industry must use. The electronic standard defines the data
397 elements that a submitter of the transaction must send (or disclose) to the requester or
398 recipient of that transaction in order to achieve the purpose of the disclosure. Where the
399 transactions are repetitive, the submitter of the transaction can deem the set of data
400 elements defined by the standard as the minimum necessary to be disclosed. (For
401 example, in the case of a claim, the purpose is to process and receive payment for a
402 service rendered, and there are set of defined data elements.) For data elements that are
403 considered “situational,” the rules defined in the standard prescribe the situations and the
404 data elements.

405

406 As noted by our panelists at the June hearing, the Attachment standard presents
407 challenging minimum necessary situations. The Attachment transaction standard is used
408 by health plans and providers to submit supplemental medical documentation in support
409 of another transaction. For example, for certain health care claims, health plans require
410 that providers submit additional supporting clinical documentation before they can be
411 processed and paid. Health Level 7 (the national standards development body for the
412 exchange, integration, sharing, and retrieval of electronic health information) finalized a
413 national set of standards for attachments in 2016, but HHS has not yet adopted the
414 standard in regulations.

414

415 In the meantime, current practices regarding the transmission of clinical data vary
416 from limiting the amount of information submitted to that defined by the payer as
417 minimally necessary, to, in some cases, sending more than the minimum necessary—
418 perhaps the entire medical record—so that a health plan can select and use the part it
419 needs in order to process the claim.

419

420 While the adoption of a national set of standards for Attachments will eliminate
421 some of these practices, there will still be a need to ensure that the standard is
422 implemented correctly, and that the parties involved—health plans and providers—

422 understand the need to define and apply consistently minimum necessary requirements to
423 requests for additional clinical documentation in an Attachment.

424 As the industry moves into the implementation of alternative payment models
425 that rely less on claim-based transactions and more on clinical documentation, and that
426 demonstrate achievement of defined service quality and outcomes goals, the potential
427 exchange of larger sets of more granular medical documentation will bring further
428 challenges to ensuring that minimum necessary standards are met.

429

430 **Recommendation 7: Framing the Minimum Necessary Standard**

431

432 **HHS should offer education that clearly illustrates how the minimum**
433 **necessary standard interacts with other provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule to**
434 **improve overall understanding. The Privacy Rule provides a four-tier framework of**
435 **protections, which is subject to some misunderstanding among covered entities and**
436 **the public. The Committee offers an analysis that explains these important**
437 **interrelationships.**

438

439 Appendix A describes the four distinct tiers of privacy protections that the
440 Privacy Rule tailors to specific circumstances. Tier 1 reflects HIPAA's base-line
441 protection: disclosing a person's PHI requires individual authorization, and the
442 individual's expressed will, rather than the minimum necessary standard, governs the
443 scope of disclosure. In Tier 2, the Privacy Rule recognizes that certain discrete uses of
444 data (listed in Appendix A, Table I) offer societal benefits so compelling as to justify the
445 use or disclosure even without the individual's authorization. Here, the individual
446 receives the protection of the minimum necessary standard, which allows disclosure *only*
447 to the extent necessary to serve the beneficial use, and no more. Tier 3 addresses certain
448 disclosures required by law. Here, applying the minimum necessary standard could
449 obstruct justice, so the Privacy Rule sets out alternative due-process standards to protect
450 the individual. Tier 4 outlines a very narrow set of circumstances (treatment and
451 regulatory compliance) where covered entities may disclose data with neither
452 authorization nor minimum necessary limitations.

453

454 The Committee is particularly concerned that some covered entities and,
455 potentially, members of the public, remain confused about basic aspects of how the
456 minimum necessary standard relates to the Privacy Rule's individual authorization
457 requirement. Based on testimony, we understand that some covered entities may, at
458 times, apply the minimum necessary standard to constrain disclosures of data even when
459 the individual has previously authorized the disclosure. The Privacy Rule offers, as its
460 baseline protection, a requirement that individuals authorize disclosures of their data
461 (Tier 1 in Appendix A). The minimum necessary standard comes into play only in certain
462 situations where an individual authorization is *not* required (Tier 2 in Appendix A). Thus,
463 it would not be appropriate for a covered entity to apply the minimum necessary standard
464 when disclosing data pursuant to an individual authorization or when responding to
465 individuals' data requests under the § 164.524 individual access right. In those instances,
466 the Privacy Rule defers to the individual's expressed wishes about the scope of the
allowed disclosure.

467 The Committee also heard some expressions of concern that individual
468 authorizations, at times, may be subject to elements of coercion (for example, when an
469 individual signs a pre-employment release form that is necessary to obtain a job). The
470 committee understands that covered entities might look to the minimum necessary
471 standard as a way to add an additional layer of protection when there are concerns about
472 whether an individual’s authorization was freely granted. However, the minimum
473 necessary standard is not the proper pathway for addressing such concerns. Any ongoing
474 concerns about coercion of individual authorizations should instead be addressed directly,
475 by providing guidance on appropriate standards for obtaining authorizations to minimize
476 the potential for coercion and to ensure that all authorizations are freely granted.

477

478 **Recommendation 8: Public Comment on Draft Guidance**

479

480 **HHS should issue updated guidance in draft form and solicit public**
481 **comment before issuing final guidance.**

482 A public comment period will bring forth compliance issues that may not have
483 been fully recognized or considered in preparing guidance. Covered entities and business
484 associates who must comply with the minimum necessary standard are at very different
485 starting points so public comment will also help to advance education, orientation and
486 preparation for compliance.

487

488 **Recommendation 9: Orientation and implementation guides**

489

490 **HHS should prepare orientation materials and implementation guides**
491 **tailored to the perspectives of various stakeholders.**

492

493 Multiple witnesses drove home the importance of education and training on use
494 and disclosure generally and the minimum necessary standard specifically. It would be
495 most helpful if orientation and guides could be tailored to the audience to raise
496 awareness, understanding, and even skill, as needed. The staff responsible for day-to-day
497 management of information use and disclosure need in depth training to apply the laws
498 and regulations through sound policy, process, and technology. Clinicians and operations
499 managers must understand the principles and policies that their organizations have
500 adopted regarding access, use and disclosure of PHI, and senior leaders responsible for
501 enterprise information governance and oversight must ensure that reasonable policies and
502 practices are in place and are being followed. One size orientation and implementation
503 guides are less useful than those tailored to a diversity of needs.

504

505 **Recommendation 10: Broad Dissemination and Communication**

506

507 **In promulgating guidance, HHS should use a range of multimedia**
508 **communications channels to disseminate published guidelines, “Frequently Asked**
509 **Questions,” web training, and case study illustrations tailored to the needs of**
510 **various constituencies. Dissemination should include a public education component.**

511

512 HHS has made great strides in stakeholder and public education regarding
information rights and regulations. The Committee urges the Department to fully use

513 these capabilities in communicating draft and final version of updated minimum
514 necessary guidance and its application. In addition to covered entities and business
515 associates, the communication plan should include law enforcement, national security,
516 public health, research, and fundraising stakeholders to advance understanding and know-
517 how in applying the minimum necessary standard. Upon release of guidance, HHS should
518 use public service communications channels to incorporate information about the
519 minimum necessary standard into consumer guidance related to information rights.

520

521 The Department has just recognized the 20-year anniversary of the HIPAA law
522 and its privacy provisions have provided the essential foundation for the rapid
523 advancements to an information-driven health system. The minimum necessary standard
524 is in turn an essential element of the Privacy Rule. The NCVHS looks forward to
525 discussing the recommendations and perspectives laid out in this letter with you and HHS
526 staff members, and to working with the Department to shape future guidance and
527 priorities for advancing this work.

528

529 Sincerely,

530

531 Walter G. Suarez, M.D., M.P.H., Chairperson,
532 National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics

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Appendix A

535

Table 1: Tiers of Privacy Protection Provided Through Interplay of the Privacy Rule's

536

Authorization Requirements and Minimum Necessary Standard

537

Tier of Privacy Protection	Circumstances falling within each Tier	Is individual authorization required?	Does the minimum necessary standard apply?
<p>Tier 1</p> <p>Disclosures directed by the individual require individual permission but are not subject to the minimum necessary standard</p>	<p>Valid authorization under § 164.508</p> <hr/>	<p>Yes</p> <hr/>	<p>No, the individual's expressed will, rather than the minimum necessary standard, determines the scope of the allowed disclosure.</p> <hr/>
	<p>Request for individual access under § 164.524</p>	<p>Individuals request disclosure, rather than authorize it</p>	<p>No, scope of disclosure is determined by HIPAA's definition and guidance on the content of the designated record set.</p>
<p>Tier 2</p> <p>Disclosures without individual authorization, but subject to the minimum necessary standard</p>	<p>Disclosures for payment and health care operations under § 164.506</p> <hr/>	<p>No</p> <hr/>	<p>Yes</p> <hr/>
	<p>Disclosures for 9 of the 12 authorization exceptions in § 164.512:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ disclosures required by laws, when disclosures are limited to those required by the law under § 164.512(a)(1) <hr/>	<p>No</p> <hr/>	<p>Yes, but § 164.512(a)(1) looks to the external laws to define the scope of disclosure needed in order to comply with them.</p> <hr/>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ public health activities § 164.512(b) <hr/>	<p>No</p> <hr/>	<p>Yes</p> <hr/>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ health oversight activities § 164.512(d) <hr/> ▪ decedents § 164.512(g): <hr/>	<p>No</p> <hr/>	<p>Yes</p> <hr/>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ cadaveric organ, eye, tissue § 164.512(h) donation <hr/> ▪ 164.512(i): research pursuant to waiver <hr/> ▪ 164.512(j): to avert serious threat to health or safety <hr/> ▪ 164.512(k): specialized governmental functions (military, national security, secret service, etc.) <hr/> ▪ 164.512(l): workers' compensation 	<p>No</p> <hr/> <p>No</p> <hr/> <p>No</p> <hr/> <p>No</p> <hr/> <p>No</p>	<p>Yes</p> <hr/> <p>Yes</p> <hr/> <p>Yes, but the scope of minimally necessary disclosure presumably would be viewed in light of the emergent threat.</p> <hr/> <p>Yes, but § 164.512(k) defers to military command authorities that publish notices in the <i>Federal Register</i> defining the scope of information necessary to their mission.</p> <hr/> <p>Yes</p>
<p>Tier 3</p> <p>Disclosures required by law that do not follow the minimum necessary standard, but alternative standards apply</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Section 164.512(a)(2) lists three types of disclosures required by law for which HIPAA sets out special requirements in lieu of the minimum necessary standard: <hr/> ▪ disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence § 164.512(c) <hr/> ▪ disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings § 164.512(e) <hr/> ▪ disclosures for law enforcement purposes § 164.512(f) 	<p>No</p> <hr/> <p>No</p> <hr/> <p>No</p>	<p>No, § 164.512(c) sets out alternative requirements that substitute for the minimum necessary standard.</p> <hr/> <p>No, § 164.512(e) sets out alternative requirements that substitute for the minimum necessary standard.</p> <hr/> <p>No, § 164.512(f) sets out alternative standards that substitute for the minimum necessary standard.</p>
<p>Tier 4</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ disclosures for treatment 	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>

No authorization or minimum necessary requirement.	§ 164.502(b)(2)(i)		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ certain disclosures to Secretary of HHS § 164.502(b)(2)(iv) 	No	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ uses and disclosures by covered entities for their own HIPAA compliance § 164.502(b)(2)(vi) 	No	No

538

539 | **The Privacy Rule’s Four Tiers of Protection**

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The minimum necessary standard interacts with other provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule to provide four distinct tiers of protection tailored to specific circumstances. These tiers are summarized in Table 1 shown in Appendix A and discussed below.

1. **HIPAA’s base-line privacy protection respects individual autonomy by requiring a valid individual authorization²⁴ or request for individual access²⁵ prior to use or disclosure of data. When an individual has authorized a disclosure, the Privacy Rule allows the individual’s expressed will, rather than the minimum necessary standard, to govern the scope of disclosures.**

The Privacy Rule’s default stance is to let the individual who is the primary subject of the protected health information, rather than a covered entity, define the scope of information that a covered entity can use or disclose. For this reason, the minimum necessary standard does not apply to disclosures made pursuant to an individual authorization for disclosure to a third party under § 164.508 or when individuals request disclosure of information to themselves under the §164.524 individual access right.²⁶

The Privacy Rule states that covered entities should honor individuals’ instructions about the use and disclosure of their data as reflected in a valid authorization: “When a covered entity obtains a valid authorization for its use or disclosure of protected health information, such use or disclosures must be *consistent with* such authorization.”²⁷ The term “consistent with” implies that covered entities should not share *more* data than the individual has authorized, but neither should they share *less* than the individual authorized. In HIPAA’s base-line scheme of privacy protection, the individual manages his or her own information, and the minimum necessary standard is irrelevant if individuals have authorized disclosure or requested access to their own information.

²⁴ See 45 §164.508.

²⁵ 45 § 164.524

²⁶ See § 164.502(b)(2)(ii)-(iii).

²⁷ See § 164.508(a)(1) (emphasis added).

566 When individuals request access to their own data, as permitted by § 164.524, the
567 scope of the required response is determined by HIPAA’s definition of the accessible
568 designated record set and associated guidance interpreting that definition. The minimum
569 necessary standard has no relevance.

570

571 **2. Socially beneficial data uses that do not require individual authorization but**
572 **must comply with the minimum necessary standard.**

573 The Privacy Rule recognizes a number of discrete situations in which public
574 interests in data sharing may outweigh the individual’s interest in blocking data flows.
575 The Privacy Rule allows data to be used and disclosed without individual authorization
576 for treatment, payment, and health care operations²⁸ and to serve twelve categories of
577 public interest listed in § 164.512. These public interest exceptions to authorization
578 include, for example, disclosures of data to public health authorities, disclosures of data
579 for research pursuant to a waiver approved by an Institutional Review Board or Privacy
580 Board (see others listed in Table 1).

581 When data can be used and disclosed without individual authorization, the
582 Privacy Rule generally protects individuals by applying the minimum necessary standard.
583 Note, however, that this is not always true. Nine of the twelve public-interest-oriented
584 authorization exceptions are subject to the minimum necessary standard,²⁹ but the other
585 three (relating to disclosures required by law) are exempt from the minimum necessary
586 standard.³⁰ They instead apply substitute standards discussed in point 3 below. Uses and
587 disclosures for payment and health care operations listed in §164.506 are subject to the
588 minimum necessary standard, but treatment is excepted from this requirement³¹ as are
589 disclosures related to HIPAA compliance and certain disclosures to the Secretary of
590 HHS.³² In these cases, no substitute standard applies as discussed in point 4 below.

591

592 **3. The special case of disclosures required by law: not subject to individual**
593 **authorization requirements or the minimum necessary standard, but subject**
594 **to alternative protections.**

595 The Privacy Rule recognizes that covered entities could be liable to charges of
596 obstructing justice if they applied the minimum necessary standard to interpret data
597 disclosures mandated by legislatures, courts, and law enforcement agencies. Therefore,
598 uses and disclosures required by law are excepted from the usual minimum necessary
599 standard.³³ Instead, the individual authorization exceptions in §164.512 contain specific
600 limitations and procedural protections that apply when covered entities must comply with
601 laws requiring reporting of data about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence;³⁴

²⁸ 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c).

²⁹ These nine are listed in 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.

³⁰ See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(v).

³¹ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(ii).

³² See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(iv),(vi) (see point 4 below).

³³ See 45. C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(v).

³⁴ 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c).


602 or disclose data for judicial or administrative proceedings,³⁵ or respond to law
603 enforcement requests.³⁶ Such disclosures do not require individual authorization and are
604 not subject to the minimum necessary standard, but the Privacy Rule ensures that they
605 observe due process and are specific and limited in scope.

606

607 **4. Uses and disclosures that neither require individual authorization nor are**
608 **subject to the minimum necessary standard.**

609 In very narrow circumstances, the Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose
610 data with no individual authorization and no minimum necessary or other standard to
611 limit the scope of disclosures. These circumstances are: disclosures for treatment, uses
612 and disclosures for HIPAA compliance, and certain disclosures to the Secretary of
613 HHS.³⁷ In these situations, burdening individual privacy by allowing these data flows
614 serves other interests that are deemed to benefit the individual. The treatment exception³⁸
615 advances individuals' interest in receiving optimal health care that is well informed by
616 unrestricted flows of data to treating providers.³⁹ The exceptions for HIPAA compliance
617 activities⁴⁰ and for HHS oversight⁴¹ both promote the individual's own privacy interests
618 by helping to ensure a strong, well-enforced HIPAA regulation. These minimum
619 necessary exceptions reflect trade-offs among competing *individual* interests (as opposed
620 to trade-offs between individual and societal interests). Their ethical justification is that
621 they place a burden on individual privacy in order to facilitate flows of data that
622 ultimately may benefit the individuals.

623



³⁵ 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).

³⁶ 45 C.f.R. § 164.512(f).

³⁷ See §§ 164.502(b)(2)(i),(iv),(vi).

³⁸ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(i).

³⁹ Best practice for security call for reasonable access controls and audit mechanisms to ensure that even in this context, information is accessible to those who need it to do their jobs. Role-based access controls are still in place, not really “free flow” of information.

⁴⁰ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(vi).

⁴¹ 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(iv).

624

Appendix B: Issues for Further Analysis and Study

625 The Committee also offers perspective on important issues that interact with and
626 were discussed as part of this phase of work on the minimum necessary standard.
627 However, they were beyond the scope of the June hearing and the Committee believes
628 that further study with respect to the minimum necessary standard and other aspects of
629 information access, use and disclosure could help the Department with additional policy
630 formulation and guidance. As part of its planning the Committee will consider how it
631 might be of assistance to the Department.

632

Technology Developments to Support Minimum Necessary

634

635 The capabilities of information technologies that will better support minimum
636 necessary are evolving and maturing. For example technology to manage disclosure of
637 information, improve role-based and attribute-based uses, segmenting sensitive health
638 information with standardized computational tools, and even codifying and executing
639 electronically patient privacy preference are improving.

640

641 According to testimony provided during the hearing, many health care
642 organizations do not utilize a comprehensive technology solution to address their
643 implementation of minimum necessary.⁴² Most methods and approaches used for
644 complying with the minimum necessary standard rely on manually executed policies and
645 procedures. This is due in part to the fact that minimum necessary is significantly
646 contextual, and in many ways depends on case-by-case analysis and interpretation of
647 what data might be minimally needed to support the purpose for which the data are being
648 requested, used, or disclosed. In the case of routine disclosures, such as external periodic
649 reporting of vital statistics or reportable conditions to public health agencies or
650 submission of claims, the HIPAA covered entity disclosing this data, in these cases a
651 provider, is permitted by the current Rule to rely on the requester of the data to determine
652 what is minimally needed, establish its internal procedures to generate this data, and
653 repeat the process without stopping each time the data is requested to define minimum
654 necessary.

655

656 Evolving health information technology functionalities have the potential to
657 improve implementation of the minimum necessary standard, particularly as more
658 information is electronically exchanged. However, these technologies must be capable of
659 at least computer assisted analysis of contextual elements (i.e., what data, for what
660 purpose) of a data request, and electronically make a determination as to whether it
661 fulfills the minimum necessary requirements, a capability that testimony confirmed is not
662 currently well developed.

663

664 NCVHS intends to consider useful follow-up hearings and study that could
665 assist in formulating recommendations to the Department to support technology solutions
666 that will advance the implementation of minimum necessary and other use and disclosure
667 challenges.

668

⁴² Needs cite from testimony.

665 The Minimum Necessary Standard in an Evolving Data Environment

666 The minimum necessary standard has enduring relevance but, in the future, it
667 will be applied in a 21st-century data environment that differs in important respects from
668 that of the past. The sharp line that once existed between "treatment" and "research"
669 grows blurrier in view of initiatives like the Learning Healthcare System,⁴³ the
670 President's Precision Medicine Initiative,⁴⁴ and the Vice President's Cancer Moonshot.⁴⁵
671 Common to these projects is a vision of harnessing data from routine treatment
672 encounters to drive a process of continuous learning (i.e., research) to inform future
673 health care and public health. The minimum necessary standard, which currently attaches
674 to research uses of data but not to treatment uses of data, may grow difficult to administer
675 in a Learning Health Care System context where data flow seamlessly from "treatment" to
676 "research" and back to "treatment."

677 At present, the data infrastructure to support a learning health care system is still
678 under development, and this Committee does not believe the time is ripe to alter the
679 minimum necessary provision's current distinction between "treatment" and "research."
680 At this time, research uses continue to be recognizably distinct from treatment uses.
681 NCVHS recommends that this issue be periodically revisited at two to three year
682 intervals as interoperable data systems continue to develop in support of continuous
683 learning.

684 Another feature of the 21st-century data environment is the growing capacity to
685 extract useful insights (for treatment, research, and public health applications) by
686 marshaling very large, detailed data resources that juxtapose individual's longitudinal
687 health histories with other sources of data characterizing their biology, behaviors,
688 exposures, outcomes, and subjective patient experiences. The minimum necessary
689 standard is rooted in a 20th-century concept of hypothesis-testing studies, where
690 investigators know in advance precisely what they are looking for and can specify the
691 data that would be "necessary" to test the hypothesis. In contrast, many 21st-century
692 research and public health questions lend themselves to hypothesis-free analysis: for
693 example, sifting through large datasets to look for correlations between genotype and
694 phenotypes to discover the clinical significance of a novel genetic variant, or searching
695 through insurance records for signals of adverse events in patients who consumed
696 particular drugs. For these analytical methods, the "minimum necessary" data to support
697 discovery may be "as much data as can be obtained."

698 The Privacy Rule has always allowed for the possibility that, for some uses, a
699 patient's entire medical record may be the minimum amount of data that is "necessary to
700 accomplish the purpose of the use, disclosure, or request" (§ 164.514(d)(5)). The Privacy
701 Rule states that when this is true, the need for the entire medical record must be
702 "specifically justified." (id.) As advanced "big data" analytic techniques grow more
703 common in coming years, covered entities may face a greater number of requests for
704 patients' entire medical records.

⁴³ cite IOM report

⁴⁴ cite OSTP PMI

⁴⁵ Provide Cancer Moonshot description and cite

705 Going forward, the NCVHS will consider how it might assist the Department to
706 study these issues and formulate recommendations on policy and guidance regarding the
707 application of the minimum necessary standard in modern analytics that require rich
708 datasets.
709

710 | Minimum Necessary and Cybersecurity

711 Strengthening the security, resiliency, and risk management of cyberspace in an
712 ever-growing digital community is now a critical component of every industry, including
713 health care. One of the main strategies has been to establish mechanisms and structures
714 for trusted information sharing and analysis of cyber threats. The National Health
715 Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NH-ISAC) is promoting information sharing
716 among health care organizations. Such efforts seek to protect valuable PHI and comply
717 with HIPAA regulations and standards. While in most cases the type of cyber threat
718 information shared by health care organizations is in aggregate, de-identified form, one of
719 the concerns raised during the hearing was the possibility of having to release certain data
720 about a cyber threat that might include information that could lead to the identification of
721 an individual. In this context, exploring the applicability of Minimum Necessary to the
722 sharing of cyber threat information would be an important area for HHS guidance.

723 HHS should include in future Minimum Necessary guidance a section devoted to
724 the applicability of Minimum Necessary to the sharing of Cyber Security threat
725 information.
726

727 Minimum Necessary and Genetic Information

728 The HITECH Act called for 2013 amendments to clarify that genetic information
729 is health information for purposes of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Thus, genetic information
730 is subject to the minimum necessary standard on the same basis as other health
731 information. However, genomic science is in an early and evolving stage that makes it
732 difficult to assess which, and how much, genetic information will be necessary for
733 specific tasks, such as conducting research into the clinical significance of specific
734 genetic variants. When the HIPAA Privacy Rule was drafted—in the late 1990s and early
735 2000s—“genetic information” was widely conceived in terms of simple, Mendelian
736 inheritance: it was thought that specific gene variants would be associated with specific
737 physical characteristics, so that particular data uses (for example, studying the cause of a
738 patient’s tremor) would only require use of a discrete, limited set of genetic variants
739 known to be associated with that type of tremor. As FDA noted in 2014, Next Generation
740 Sequencing (NGS) technology is revolutionizing the current view of how inheritance
741 works by making it possible to study large segments of an individual’s DNA or an
742 individual’s entire genome.⁴⁶ NGS is revealing that many traits of interest for treatment,

⁴⁶ U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Food & Drug Admin. *Optimizing FDA’s Regulatory Oversight of Next Generation Sequencing Diagnostic Tests—Preliminary Discussion Paper* (Dec. 29,

743 public health, and research purposes—such as a person’s susceptibility to chronic
744 diseases—depend on very large constellations of genetic variants that may be scattered
745 widely throughout the human genome. It is difficult to say which genetic variants are the
746 “minimum necessary” to diagnose or study a disease, when new associations between
747 genes and diseases are being discovered almost weekly.

748 Moreover, emerging evidence suggests that even when patients have genetic
749 variants known to be associated with a disease, they may nevertheless remain healthy
750 because of other variants that confer resistance.⁴⁷ Attempts to limit disclosure to known
751 disease-associated variants could harm patients by failing to capture other, seemingly
752 unrelated variants that affect disease manifestation.

753 A more practical concern is that genomic testing laboratories store information
754 from an individual’s NGS testing in large, standard file types and it could be burdensome
755 to task laboratories with extracting specific genomic variants from these files, even if the
756 current state of genomic science could identify which variants are the “minimum
757 necessary” for a particular use.

758 Application of the minimum necessary standard to genomic testing files requires
759 further study and the Committee will consider follow-up study of application of the
760 minimum necessary to HIPAA-protected genomic testing data.

761

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2014), at:

<http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/newsevents/workshopsconferences/ucm427869.pdf>).

⁴⁷ See Nature Biotech Resilience project report published in the last couple of months